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Panel: Discrimination and Harassment Issues in Higher Education 
 
Harassment: Academic Freedom Issues and a Union’s Duty of Fair Representation 
 
April 5, 2016 
 
I. Harassment defined – Sources of harassment prohibitions/academic freedom & free 
speech issues 
a. Statutory – Federal 
i. Title VII/ADA/ADEA – Discrimination in employment 
1. Discrimination prohibited based on race, color, national origin, 
sex, and religion, disability, and age. The EEOC and some courts 
have also held Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity. See Baldwin v. 
Department of Transportation, Appeal No. 0120133080 (EEOC 
July 15, 2015) (sexual orientation); Macy v. Department of 
Justice, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC April 20, 2012) (gender 
identity); Isaacs v. Felder Services, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-693 (MHT), 
2015 WL 6560655 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2015) (sexual 
orientation); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(gender identity). 
2. Harassment as a form of discrimination 
a. “Hostile environment” harassment: 
i. The standard for evaluating claims of hostile-
environment harassment will depend on the 
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status of the harasser: “If the harassing employee 
is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable 
only if it was negligent in controlling working 
conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a 
supervisor, however, different rules apply. If the 
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible 
employment action, the employer is strictly 
liable. But if no tangible employment action is 
taken, the employer may escape liability by 
establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) 
the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct any harassing behavior and 
(2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the preventive or corrective 
opportunities that the employer provided.” 
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
ii. To be actionable, harassment must be so “severe 
or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the 
victim's employment and create an abusive 
working environment.” Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). This requires an 
objectively hostile or abusive environment, as 
well as the victim's subjective perception that 
the environment is abusive. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
iii. Hostile environment claims can be based on any 
protected class. See, e.g., Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001) (disability); Dediol 
v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 
2011) (age); Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, 804 F.3d 826, 832 
(7th Cir. 2015) (religion and national origin). 
Same-sex harassment is actionable. Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 
(1998); E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 
444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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b. “Tangible employment action/quid pro quo” 
harassment: if an employer makes an adverse 
employment decision about an individual based on the 
individual’s having rejected the sexual advances of a 
supervisor, or if an individual loses out on a possible 
promotion because a fellow employee who submitted to 
the sexual advances of a supervisor was promoted 
instead on that basis, the harassment is categorized as 
quid pro quo. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2). 
ii. Title IX/Rehabilitation Act – Discrimination by recipients of federal 
funding. Courts generally apply the same standards as Title VII/ADA. 
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (Title IX applies to sex discrimination in 
employment by covered recipients of federal funds); see also Lipsett v. 
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying Title 
VII legal analysis to claims under Title IX); Murray v. N.Y. Univ., 57 F.3d 
243 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 
2001) (same). 
iii. National Labor Relations Act -- The NLRB has found workplace 
bullying and harassment based on concerted activity or other union 
activity to be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. See Northwest 
Graphics, Inc., 342 NLRB 1288 (2004); Garvey Marine, Inc., 328 NLRB 
991 (1999).  
b. Statutory – state and local. State and local laws may include additional 
classes of individuals protected against discrimination and harassment. See, 
e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (prohibiting discrimination based on “age, race, 
creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, 
predisposing genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic violence 
victim status”). 
c. Collective Bargaining Agreements  
i. CBAs can provide broader coverage by including additional classes of 
individuals protected against discrimination (such as sexual 
orientation or marital status) or by having class-blind protection 
against harassment. See, e.g., CBA between GAO and GAO Employees 
Organization (provision addressing workplace bullying), available at 
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http://www.gaoemployees.org/uploads/3/1/3/4/31346281/analyst
cba_rev_2013.pdf.   
ii. CBAs can have more expansive standards for the kinds of conduct that 
qualify as harassment. See, e.g., MOU between the University of 
Washington and UAW (agreement with unionized graduate student 
teaching assistants specifically recognizing a right to teach in an 
environment free of “microaggressions”), available at 
http://www.uaw4121.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MOU-
microaggressions.pdf.   
iii. CBAs can waive unit members’ rights to bring statutory 
discrimination claims in court. The Supreme Court has upheld clear 
waivers in a CBA requiring employment discrimination claims (like 
sexual harassment) to be made in arbitration. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). Some argue that, because protections 
from harassment and employment discrimination are highly valued 
by a minority of members and valued substantially less by the 
majority, unions face temptation to bargain away such protections for 
things the majority values more highly. See Deborah A. Widiss, 
Divergent Interests: Union Representation of Individual Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 87 Ind. L.J. 421, 423 (2012). 
d. University policies – Universities may implement their own harassment 
policies that go beyond the protections of federal, state, or local law.  
i. Bargaining issues: an attempt by an employer to unilaterally impose 
an anti-harassment, anti-bullying, mutual respect, or some similar 
policy in a unionized workplace may be subject to challenge—
particularly to the extent that it comes with disciplinary 
consequences, because discipline is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. See, e.g., Southern Mail, Inc., 345 NLRB 644 (2005) 
(“Mandatory subjects of bargaining include the circumstances in 
which discipline will be imposed for violations of employer policies.”). 
ii. Other NLRA issues: Some policies or applications of policies may be 
invalid because they risk interfering with employees’ rights under the 
NLRA to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. 
Anti-bullying policies that proscribe any negative comments about 
other employees, for example, may be read as an impermissible 
prohibition on employees making complaints about their supervisors. 
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See Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB 832 (2005); Hispanics United of 
Buffalo, Inc., 59 NLRB No. 37 (2012). 
e. Academic Freedom and First Amendment concerns 
i. First Amendment – Public university faculty generally have a First 
Amendment right to speak on academic matters and issues of public 
concern without fear of retaliation by the employer. Demers v. Austin, 
746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014); Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.–
Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). But see Trejo v. Shoben, 319 
F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (professor’s sexually-charged comments 
were a matter of private concern and not protected by the First 
Amendment). Accordingly, several cases have struck down overbroad 
harassment policies that restricted protected academic speech. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (in a case 
brought by a biopsychology graduate student who was concerned that 
research theories he wished to explore could be labeled "racist" or 
"sexist" under the university’s harassment policy, the court struck 
down the policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); UWM 
Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down the University of Wisconsin’s 
harassment code as unconstitutionally overbroad because it included 
prohibitions on “discriminatory comments, epithets or other 
expressive behavior directed at an individual… [that] 
intentionally…[d]emean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, 
sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual . . . 
and [c]reate an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for 
education, university-related work, or other university-authorized 
activity”); Silva v. Univ. of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994) 
(holding that that a professor, who had been suspended under the 
university’s sexual harassment policy, was constitutionally protected 
in drawing an analogy during class between sex and writing, as the 
comments were part of his academic freedom to teach about writing). 
At least one court has said that “we doubt that a college professor's 
expression on a matter of public concern, directed to the college 
community, could ever constitute unlawful harassment.” Rodriguez v. 
Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 2010).  
ii. Academic freedom – Faculty should be entitled to full freedom in 
research and in the publication of the results, freedom in the 
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classroom in discussing their subject, and freedom from institutional 
censorship when they speak or write as citizens. See AAUP Statement 
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940), available at 
http://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf. In March 2016, 
AAUP issued a report criticizing the Department of Education’s recent 
guidance on sexual harassment under Title IX, complaining that the 
new guidance applies an overly broad definition sexual harassment 
and inadequately protecting the due-process rights of those accused 
of harassment. See The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX (Mar. 24, 
2016), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIX-Report.pdf. 
iii. Several recent examples highlight the tension between harassment 
codes and academic freedom: 
1. After writing an article critical of “sexual paranoia” on college 
campuses, Northwestern University Professor Laura Kipnis 
was herself the target of a Title IX complaint alleging that her 
article amounted to harassment and retaliation against 
students who report sexual misconduct. The complaint was 
investigated and ultimately dismissed. See Laura Kipnis, My 
Title IX Inquisition (May 29, 2015), available at 
http://laurakipnis.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/My-
Title-IX-Inquisition-The-Chronicle-Review-.pdf. 
2. Patricia Adler, a tenured sociology professor at the University 
of Colorado, was told that she could not deliver a lecture on 
prostitution because of complaints that the content of the 
lecture could make some listeners uncomfortable. Adler 
accepted a buyout and left the university. See Scott Jaschik, Too 
Risky for Boulder? (Dec. 16, 2013), available at 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/12/16/tenured
-professor-boulder-says-she-being-forced-out-over-lecture-
prostitution. 
3. Professor John McAdams at Marquette University was 
disciplined for writing on his blog about a graduate teaching 
assistant after she wouldn't allow a conservative 
undergraduate to voice opposition to gay marriage in an ethics 
class discussion. McAdams blog post was highly critical of the 
graduate student and identified her by name; readers of the 
blog then apparently targeted the graduate student with 
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threatening emails. The University suspended McAdams for 
one year and conditioned his reinstatement on making an 
apology to the graduate student. McAdams has declared that he 
will not apologize. See Karen Herzog, Suspended Marquette 
professor McAdams says he won't apologize (Mar. 28, 2016), 
available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/suspended-
marquette-professor-mcadams-says-he-wont-apologize-
b99695888z1-373773981.html  
 
II. Union liability for harassment 
a. Union can be liable for its own discrimination (e.g., in carrying out its duties 
as exclusive representative or in administering apprenticeship program). See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers, 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Electrical Workers, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); Hameed v. Bridge Workers, 
637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980); Eldredge v. Carpenters, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th 
Cir.1987); Maalik v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 437 F.3d 650, 
652 (7th Cir. 2006). Additionally, unions may be liable even for well-
intentioned but legally-incorrect steps taken to shield (for example) women 
from an environment of harassment; a union that refused to refer women to 
a particular job because of the hostile work environment at the job site gave 
rise to a claim for the women. See Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers and Pipefitters 
Union, 644 F. Supp. 795 (D. Mass. 1986). At least one court has held that Title 
VII creates liability for union that opposes discipline of a harasser regardless 
of the underlying merits of the accusation. See EEOC v. General Motors Corp., 
11 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
b. Liability for union inaction in the face of employer discrimination or 
harassment is unsettled. 
i. Supreme Court: Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) 
(holding that a union's refusal to grieve complaints by black members 
about racial discrimination violates Title VII). 
ii. Some circuits hold that mere acquiescence is enough. In these circuits, 
unions that do not act to stop sexual harassment may be in violation 
of the law. That said, many still require both knowledge of the 
underlying discrimination and an active decision not to bring a 
grievance (whether to protect other members, or otherwise). See, e.g., 
Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.1991); 
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Howard v. Int'l Molders Union, 779 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986). See also 
York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948 (10th Cir.1996) (adopting so-called 
acquiescence theory but noting “mere inaction does not constitute 
acquiescence” and requiring “(1) knowledge that prohibited 
discrimination may have occurred and (2) a decision not to assert the 
discrimination claim”); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (“it is clear that in some circumstances a union may be held 
responsible for an employer's discriminatory practices if it has not 
taken affirmative action against those practices”).  
iii. Other circuits hold that mere acquiescence is not enough. In these 
circuits, the courts require a plaintiff to show some greater level of 
culpability by the union, such as facilitating harassment in some 
fashion. EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656 (7th 
Cir. 2003); Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826 (8th 
Cir. 2002); Martin v. Local 1513, 859 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1988); Anjelino 
v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 95 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Ellison v. 
Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070 (Alaska 
2005). 
c. This area of law is also complicated because so many cases addressing union 
liability involve mixed cases of acquiescence to an environment of 
harassment, and harassment by union shop stewards. See, e.g., Dutrisac v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1983). 
III. DFR claims against a union arising out of allegations of harassment between co-
workers 
a. Duty of Fair Representation Defined: The DFR “requires a union to serve the 
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to 
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid 
arbitrary conduct. A union must discharge its duty both in bargaining with 
the employer and in its enforcement of the resulting collective-bargaining 
agreement.” Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); see also 
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The DFR, however, does not prevent a 
union from “taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals 
whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees 
against that of another ... [because] conflict between employees represented 
by the same union is a recurring fact.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 
(1964). 
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b. The DFR can be particularly complicated in cases where both the alleged 
harasser and victim are bargaining unit members. “A union owes a duty of 
fair representation to both a victim of alleged harassment and to the worker 
accused of harassment, if they are members of the collective bargaining unit.” 
See Mary K. O'Melveny, Negotiating the Minefields: Selected Issues for Labor 
Unions Addressing Sexual Harrasment Complaints My Represented Employees, 
15 Lab. Law. 321(2000); see also Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 
847 (D. Minn. 1993).  
c. Potential DFR claims by the victim of harassment 
i. Generally the employee complaining of harassment must have filed a 
grievance or made a formal complaint in order to trigger a DFR claim. 
See e.g., Badlam v. Reynolds Metals Co., 46 F.Supp.2d 187 (N.D.N.Y. 
1999)(dismissing claim against union because it found that union had 
not acquiesced, based in part on union’s stated willingness to help 
plaintiff employee file a grievance that employee ultimately never 
filed); see also Catley v. Graphic Communications International Union 
Local 277-M, 982 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (employee must ask 
union to file grievance before union acquires a duty). 
ii. Although a union’s failure to act generally does not breach the union’s 
DFR, see, e.g., Grant v. Burlington Indus., 832 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 
1987), an employee who had been harassed could win a DFR claim 
against a union by showing that a) the employer violated the CBA, b) 
the union failed to act to hold the employer to account, c) the union’s 
disinclination to act was based on an improper gender-motivated bias. 
See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 561 (1976). 
iii. Favoring another employee over the victim may violate the DFR if that 
decision is not based on having investigated the relative merits of 
competing claims. See e.g., Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 
F.2d 1229, 1237 (8th Cir. 1980) (cert. denied).  
iv. At least one court has endorsed the idea that an elected union 
representative of a largely male constituency has an inherent 
incentive to be biased in this context, while finding that a failure to 
represent a union member in her attempt to bring charges of sexual 
harassment against three other union members violated Title VII. See 
EEOC v. Regency Architectural Metals Corp., 896 F. Supp. 260 (D. Conn. 
1995). 
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d. Potential DFR claims by perpetrator of harassment 
i. The subject of a harassment complaint, if disciplined, may file a DFR 
complaint against a union that declines to represent him. However, in 
this context, a union making a good faith investigation before 
declining to grieve the member’s transfer—even though the union’s 
own investigation concluded that the harassment claims lacked legal 
merit—may protect the union from liability. See Greenslade v. Chicago 
Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1997). (The court did, however, 
note both that the transferred employee’s conduct had been 
inappropriate, and that the CBA included a unilateral right for the 
employer to transfer an employee for any reason.) 
ii. Some member harassers have classified their claims against a union 
as defamation—that is, unsurprisingly, union representatives or 
investigators siding with the harassed employee during a grievance 
proceeding may say something that paints the harasser in an 
unflattering light. These theories have largely failed because grievance 
proceedings are protected by qualified privilege, and proving actual 
malice or reckless disregard for truth requires a tremendous showing 
by a plaintiff. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Note 
also that some employers are protected on the basis of having a 
“legitimate business interest” in informing, for example, another office 
about the backstory of a transferred employee. See Garziano v. E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987). 
e. Employer challenge to arbitration awards 
i. Vacating an award after arbitration on public policy grounds should 
only happen in exceptional circumstances. To do so, a court must find 
a well-defined public policy, and that the arbitrator’s award itself 
violated that policy. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine 
Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000). 
ii. Even though there is a defined public policy against harassment, there 
is not a defined policy about specific disciplinary steps—and as such, 
courts have difficulty justifying overturning an arbitrator’s decision 
about discipline. See Stephen Plass, Reconciling the Public Policy 
Exception to Enforcing Contracts with Title VII's Public Policy on 
Disciplining Harassers, 19 St. Thomas L. Rev. 407 (2007); see also Way 
Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local No. 164, 363 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2004) 
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(upholding arbitrator’s award reducing discipline for employee’s 
racially derogatory comments); Weber Aircraft Inc. v. Gen. 
Warehousemen Union Local 767, 253 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. 2001) (same 
with regard to award reinstating employee who sexually harassed co-
worker); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 171 F.3d 
971 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union, Allied 
Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).  
iii. However, there are plenty of examples to the contrary. See, e.g., 
Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 
840 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating arbitration award that reinstated 
employee who had repeatedly harassed co-workers); Stroehmann 
Bakeries, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 776, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(vacating arbitration award that reinstated employee accused of 
sexual harassment without determining whether harassment actually 
occurred); State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391, 69 A.3d 927 (Conn. 
2013) (vacating arbitration award that reduced harasser’s 
punishment from termination to a one-year suspension because “the 
public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace required the 
[employee’s] dismissal”); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. AFSCME Council 
33, Local 934, 52 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2012) (vacating arbitration award 
that awarded reinstatement and backpay to employee who engaged in 
“lewd, lascivious and extraordinarily perverse” harassment of a co-
worker). 
f. Basic approaches for a union’s handling of grievances alleging harassment by 
a co-worker: 
i. Pursue separate grievances for each member: If the union simply 
decides to have separate representation for employees with 
competing interests, it may be insulated from suits alleging breach of 
DFR even absent having declined to make any investigation 
whatsoever. See Hellums v. Quaker Oats, Co., 760 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 
1985); see also Nolan v. Epifanio, No. 96 CIV. 2562 (JSR), 1998 WL 
665131 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1998) (union providing employee with 
counsel to pursue an internal complaint satisfied union’s 
responsibilities to individual under DFR). 
ii. Investigate the underlying circumstances and make a credibility 
determination, and pursue the grievance/represent the interests of 
the credible employee. See Hellums v. Quaker Oats, Co., 760 F.2d 202 
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(8th Cir. 1985); see also Tate v. Teamsters, No. 90-CV-93, 1990 WL 
424984 (E.D. Va. Oct. 9, 1990), aff'd, 952 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1992). 
iii. Represent both: There is no conflict of interest in this context; the 
Supreme Court has recognized that barring the union from operating 
when two union employees have a conflict would “weaken the 
collective bargaining and grievance process.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 
U.S. 335 (1964). In at least one case, a court has found that a union 
representing both a member and a different member of whom the 
first had claimed harassment did not violate the DFR. See Marshall v. 
Ormet Corp., 736 F.Supp. 1462 (S.D. Ohio 1990). 
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